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BOOK REVIEW
Two perspectives on power: a Frankfurt take on a
contentious concept
Logik der Macht: Zum Ort der Kritik zwischen Theorie und Praxis, by David
Strecker, Weilerswist, Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2012, 320 pp., €32.90 (hardback),
ISBN 9783938808641
As the title of David Strecker’s book – which translates as The logic of power: on
the site of critique between theory and practice – suggests, Strecker has set himself
a highly ambitious task. This task is nothing less than to chart the conceptual struc-
ture of power through a reconstruction of the ‘logic’ of its recent theoretical history.
His central claim is that this conceptual structure – the logic of power – should be
understood in terms of the unavoidability of two methodological perspectives that
are both necessary and only together sufﬁcient for a satisfactory account of power.
This is how Strecker describes his main line of argument in the introduction:
My entire argumentation is directed towards demonstrating that concerning the
question of which social relationships are to be understood as power relations in need
of justiﬁcation, no principled criterion can be justiﬁed that would allow us to sidestep
the incessant to-and-fro between the objectivating perspective of the social-scientiﬁc
observer and the simultaneously higher-ranking perspective of the participant in
societal practice (p. 11).
According to Strecker, any social-scientiﬁc attempt to account for power relations
without recourse to normative judgement is doomed to fail, since the ‘social-scientiﬁc
observer may be able to identify relations of cause and effect, but these can only be
characterised as infused with power by relying on the normative views of the
affected’ (p. 10). Since the objectivating perspective cannot do without the participant
perspective, which is inherently oriented towards questioning the legitimacy and
justiﬁcation of power, any comprehensive analysis of power is therefore always an
exercise in social criticism. Strecker calls this ‘the paradox of power’ and he claims
that it requires both a strict methodological separation of the observer and participant
levels of analysis as well as a convincing mediation between them.
First, a note on the method and overall argument of the book. Strecker’s argu-
mentative strategy is to develop a ‘history of theory with systematic intent’ (p. 11)
– a Hegelian methodological staple familiar also from the work of Jürgen Haber-
mas and Axel Honneth – and Strecker’s view shares more than a methodological
kinship with the two Frankfurt philosophers (see Habermas 1987a, Honneth 1991).
Indeed, the distinction between the objectivating and the participatory perspective
primarily derives from Habermas’s The theory of communicative action (1994,
p. 111) and Strecker’s book can be read as a retrospective reconstruction of how
every theory of power before Habermas’s has faltered on an inability to appropri-
ately distinguish and mediate between these two methodological points of view.
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This may seem like an oddly circular exercise, but the point of such Hegelian
‘histories of theory’ is precisely to allow the reader to follow the historical develop-
ment of a domain of research and recognise this development as a kind of learning
process, where the standards used for classifying and evaluating the material are
worked out in the course of the investigation. Strecker should thus be read as chart-
ing a dynamic learning process in the conceptual history of power that culminates
in Habermas’s critical social theory, where the latter’s solutions are indirectly
foreshadowed by the problems encountered by earlier attempts to grapple with this
contentious concept. To be sure, this is an incredibly strong and broad-sweeping
interpretive claim. The obvious danger is that Strecker might also, from a less sym-
pathetic point of view, be read as engaged in the more openly question-begging
project of measuring the theoretical history of power against standards provided by
Habermas and concluding that – surprise! – only Habermas’s theory succeeds
where others have failed. Strecker’s considerable interpretive burden of justiﬁcation
is to convince us that the former reading is the correct one.
I am not altogether convinced that he succeeds in meeting this burden. In the
interest of honesty, I should note that my doubts are mitigated by my own Haberm-
asian sympathies and the intuitive appeal that I – perhaps for this reason – ﬁnd in
Strecker’s conclusions. But I can easily imagine that those who see a superior form
of critique in Foucault’s genealogies of power would sharply disagree. In his rather
brief discussion of Foucault’s work, Strecker resurrects Habermas’s claim that
Foucault’s genealogies suffer from ‘crypto-normativism’, since the French philoso-
pher is so unabashedly unconcerned with clarifying their normative presupposi-
tions1 (pp. 82–83, 106). However, the claim that such a clariﬁcation is necessary
remains an assumption brought to Foucault’s work from without; and although this
is precisely what Strecker should be proving in order to justify his claim that Hab-
ermas’s distinction between the perspectives of observer and participant represents
a conceptual advance vis-à-vis Foucault’s genealogies, he does not really bring any
new considerations to bear on this difﬁcult and highly controversial issue (for a dis-
cussion of genealogy as critique, see Saar 2010). Moreover, a more general concern
is that Strecker’s ‘history of theory’ is, in fact, fairly cursory; it merely takes up
Part I of the book – which covers a lot of ground in a mere 100 pages – while Part
II and III are concerned with reconstructing, respectively, the Frankfurt School
model of Ideologiekritik and Habermas’s critical social theory, as attempts to cap-
ture the logic of power through the distinction between observer and participant.
But the latter two parts actually presuppose rather than contribute to ‘demonstrat-
ing’ the truth of Strecker’s central claim. However, even if these considerations cast
some doubt on whether Strecker succeeds in meeting the aforementioned interpre-
tive burden of justiﬁcation, they do not speak against the weaker judgement that
Strecker’s book provides a daring and provocative reading of the theoretical history
of power that makes a strong and original case for the need to distinguish between
the observer and participant perspectives in theorising power. Indeed, in my view,
Strecker’s great contribution should rather be understood as providing an analysis
of power from the point of view of the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory
and anyone interested in that tradition – and in Habermas in particular – should
consider Strecker’s book a must-read.
Now to a brief outline of some of the more speciﬁc arguments of the book.
Early on, Strecker makes a helpful tripartite distinction between three dimensions
of power in ordinary language: power as an ‘existence concept’ (Seinsbegriff der
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Macht); power as an ‘action concept’ (Handlungsmacht); and ‘social power’
(Gesellschaftsliche Macht) (pp. 18–19). The existence concept of power refers to
its most abstract sense, understood as a potential property of all things, such as a
powerful current or idea. The action concept of power is understood as the speciﬁ-
cally human capacity to effect a change in the world, whereas social power limits
its application to social or political contexts. These distinctions enable Strecker to
specify his project as the reconstruction of the discourse on social power, thus side-
stepping a host of semantic hurdles. Social power is best understood in terms of
the German term Herrschaft, which is rather difﬁcult to translate. The most obvious
candidate is ‘rule’, though in its broadest sense (which is not limited to formal
political rule); it encapsulates the insight that any social order is characterised by
more or less stabilised and formalised relations of power. This broad sense is cap-
tured in Weber’s famous deﬁnition of Herrschaft, often – and to my mind, falsely
– translated as ‘domination’, as ‘the probability that a command with a given spe-
ciﬁc content will be obeyed by a given group of persons’ (Weber 1978, p. 53). It
is, thus, within the dimension of social power that we ﬁnd the two predominant tra-
ditions in the theoretical history of power, what Strecker calls the traditions of
‘repressive power’ and ‘constitutive power’.
As suggested by its deﬁning adjective, the tradition of repressive power sees an
internal connection between power and its illegitimacy. Strecker reconstructs this
tradition – in which the Anglo-American debate on the ‘faces of power’ and the
Marxist tradition take pride of place – as proceeding through an initial focus on the
‘site’ of power, moving to a focus on its modi operandi and ﬁnally its social func-
tions, in which we ﬁnd a categorial shift to structural power and an increasing
appreciation of the fact that power not only fulﬁls a repressive function but also
constitutes social order. This leads us to the tradition of constitutive power, which
starts from the insight that the assumed illegitimacy of power as inherently repres-
sive obscures the potentially productive function of power. In the work of Talcott
Parsons and Hannah Arendt, power is thus seen either as the generalised medium
of social order or as the ability of groups to act in concert. However, since this tra-
dition falls in the opposite trap of presenting an overly benign picture of power, a
third and more recent tradition has emerged – primarily in sociology and continen-
tal philosophy – that is guided by the intention to mediate between the repressive
and constitutive traditions of power.
Through a somewhat condensed discussion of the extremely complex work of
Niklas Luhmann, Anthony Giddens and Foucault, Strecker ultimately locates the
seeds of a solution to the problem of mediation in the praxeology of Pierre
Bourdieu. With his central concept of habitus, Bourdieu captures both Giddens’
insight that power should be reduced to neither structure nor agency, as well as
Foucault’s insight that power constitutes social order primarily through the sociali-
sation of subjects. However, although Bourdieu takes steps towards disentangling
the observer and participant perspective, he too ultimately fails to see that the key
to mediating between repressive and constitutive power lies precisely in the careful
separation of these two levels of analysis. Along with the remaining contenders, he
thus ends up losing his way in the cul de sac of crypto-normativism where the
question concerning the normative justiﬁability of an at once repressive and consti-
tutive power recedes into the background.
After this tour de force through the recent theoretical history of power,
Strecker shifts to a higher level of abstraction and considers the Frankfurt
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School model of Ideologiekritik as a candidate for achieving this methodological
separation and mediation. The idea of a critical theory – paradigmatically
formulated in Max Horkheimer’s famous essay Traditional and critical theory
(1999, pp. 188–243) – proceeds through a two-step procedure: in a ﬁrst step,
the social-scientiﬁc observer clariﬁes unrecognised relations of power relying on
an account of the true interests and false consciousness of the oppressed, who,
in a second step, are supposed to rely on this account for their practical eman-
cipation. That is, critical theory ﬁrst takes up the perspective of the observer of
social practice and the participants in society are then subsequently tasked with
enacting the emancipatory hypotheses in their own practice. Accordingly, the
truth of these hypotheses, as well as the critical theory of society from which
they derive, ultimately depends on their ability to enable emancipation in prac-
tice – an account of social-theoretical truth that I refer to in my own work as a
practical criterion of validity.
However, Horkheimer’s original materialist programme of critical theory soon
broke down on account of the increasingly obvious implausibility of the assump-
tion that the proletariat provided a historical subject capable of validating critical
theory in practice. This gave way, on the one hand, to the near-hopeless critique of
Horkheimer and Adorno’s The dialectic of enlightenment, in which the participant
perspective was projected into an uncertain future and, on the other hand, to the
political sociology of Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, who lost sight of the
participant perspective altogether. However, as the ﬁrst generation of the Frankfurt
School lost their way in search of the appropriate mediation between observer and
participant perspectives and theory and practice, the original aspirations of critical
theory were taken up by a new generation represented in Strecker’s narrative by
Claus Offe and Habermas.
Before proceeding any further, however, I would like to register my regret that
Strecker does not dig a bit deeper into Theodor W. Adorno’s attempt to mediate
between the repressive and the constitutive traditions of power. As Foucault (2007)
recognised, Adorno anticipated many of his own reﬂections on power, not only in
terms of the shared appreciation of Nietzsche’s genealogical method, but also in
terms of the assumption that subjects are constituted by the structural ordering and
socialisation of their perceived needs and ‘space of reasons’. I would have preferred
more in-depth discussion of these overlaps in the thought of Foucault and Adorno,
which might very well stem from their respective conceptions of power, instead of
Strecker’s fairly stylised account of Adorno’s work and rather uncharitable claim
that it remains captive to the tradition of repressive power (p. 173). To my mind,
Strecker misses such opportunities for more ﬁnely tuned discussiosn precisely
because his perspective is so encompassing, preferring the broader picture over
careful attention to difference and detail.
The welcome exception to this rule is Strecker’s discussion of Habermas’s
critical social theory, which is at once comprehensive and knowledgeable and
includes original interpretations of Habermas’s communicative account of the
concept of ideology and his famous but oft-misunderstood ‘colonization thesis’. As
should be evident by now, Strecker sees Habermas’s key achievement in the
discourse on power as the careful distinction between the observer and participant
perspectives. Compared with the ﬁrst generation of the Frankfurt School,
Habermas’s major innovation is that he no longer construes the distinction between
observer and participant as perfectly overlapping with the distinction between
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theory and practice, but rather sees both the observer and the participant perspec-
tive as domains of theoretical reconstruction. The speciﬁcs of Habermas’s account
– rational reconstruction of pragmatic presuppositions of rational discourse
(participant perspective); an account of the market and the state as functional sub-
systems (observer perspective); and their practical mediation through democratically
legitimated law – shall not concern us here. Instead, I want to conclude with a clo-
ser look at Strecker’s original answer to the age-old question concerning the proper
mediation between theory and practice.
Strecker’s reﬂections take their starting point in a late reappearance of Foucault
and Bourdieu in his reconstructive narrative, both of whom insist that there is no
site in social practice that is not shot through with power – including, alas, rational
discourse. Given this claim, it may seem indefensible to assume that any actual dis-
course could have the presumption of rationality (of generating ‘good reasons’),
which seems necessary for Habermas’s account to preserve its moment of imma-
nent transcendence. In the face of this problem, Strecker spots a way out by
appealing to the Kantian idea of autonomy – which, of course, not only represents
the normative core of Habermas’s critical social theory, but a central concept in the
whole discourse on power. Strecker’s proposal is to take account of the intertwine-
ment of power and reason by translating the idea of autonomy into a distinction
between participant and observer in both theory and practice. The latter leaves us
with an account of what Strecker calls ‘participatory objectivation’ (p. 301) com-
plementary to Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy. The basic idea is that
in addition to the ﬁrst-order participatory perspective in practice, in which we par-
ticipate in the ﬁrst-order justiﬁcation and critique of society’s norms, practices and
institutions, we add to the public sphere a second-order domain of participation in
the ongoing questioning and critique of the power structures that have contributed
to the constitution of our identities and space of reasons. The social sciences are
afforded the role of enlightening democratic citizens about the social forces that
have made them who they are, and the results of this collective self-questioning are
supposed to translate into emancipatory institutional reform. Unfortunately, Strecker
gives few hints as to the institutional content of his account of autonomy as partici-
patory objectivation, so one is left guessing at this crucial juncture.
However, a potentially more serious problem – at least from Habermas’s point
of view – is that Strecker’s proposal essentially amounts to giving up on the aspira-
tion to reconstruct reason from communicative practice. The point of Habermas’s
reconstruction of discursive presuppositions is precisely to ground his critical social
theory in the rational infrastructure of linguistic communication. To be sure,
Strecker describes his proposal as a way of ensuring that practical discourse gains
the presumption of rationality that actual discourse – according to Foucault and
Bourdieu – lacks, but this normative recommendation cannot itself be grounded in
the reconstruction that it is supposed to bolster. If Habermas were to allow a
normative recommendation to serve as a solution to the problem that even rational
discourse might not provide an anchor in social practice free from the contingencies
of power, then his account would only preserve its moment of transcendence by
relinquishing its moment of immanence.
The ﬁnal point gives reason to doubt whether Strecker has ultimately solved the
age-old problem of how to properly mediate between theory and practice – at least
within a Habermasian framework. But his argument that an account of this prob-
lem, as well as the methodological distinction between observer and participant
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from which it derives, is part and parcel of any satisfactory account of power is
both original and – to me, at least – highly compelling. Aside from its many
insightful discussions, that insight alone would provide reason to read Strecker’s
engaging, provocative and highly ambitious book; one can only encourage the
English translation that it deserves.
Note
1. See Habermas (1987b). The claim was ﬁrst made by Fraser (1981).
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